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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
:

Subject to Assignment in the
Utah Court of Appeals

v.
THOMAS CHARLES POWELL,

Case No. 20050810-SC

DEFENDANT/APPELLEE.
:

Incarcerated

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this criminal case involving first degree felony
convictions entered in a court of record, by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i).
ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION
1. Did the trial court err in instructing the jury on attempted murder based on
knowing and depraved indifference mens rea levels?
Standard of Review: Jury instructions are reviewed for correctness, without
deference to the trial court. Rg, Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah 1998).
This issue was not preserved by trial counsel. Powell relies on the doctrines of
plain error, exceptional circumstances and ineffective assistance of counsel in raising this
issue.
2. Did the trial court err in refusing Powell's lesser included offense instructions?
Standard of Review: Rulings on jury instructions are reviewed for correctness,

without deference to the trial court. Kg, Child v. Gonda. 972 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah 1998).
This issue was preserved by trial counsel (R. 105-108, R. 236 at 226-330).
3. Does the cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct and errors in the
admission of evidence require a new trial?
This Court reviews claims of prosecutorial misconduct under an abuse of
discretion standard, and will reverse of the prosecutor's conduct or remarks called the
jury's attention to improper matters in circumstances indicating a reasonable likelihood of
a more favorable result absent the misconduct. See, State v. Kohl 2000 UT 35, H 22, 999
P.2d 7.
Rulings on the admission of evidence are reviewed for correctness. See, e.g.,
Cazeras v. Cosbv. 2003 UT 3, f 11, 65 P.3d 1184.
These issues were largely not preserved by trial counsel. Powell relies on the
doctrines of plain error, exceptional circumstances and ineffective assistance of counsel
in raising these issues.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are in the addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
The State charged Mr. Powell and co-defendant Tamara Ross with aggravated
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302, and aggravated
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burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203, with a gun
enhancement (R. 5-7). Following preliminary hearing, the magistrate ordered Powell
bound over on an amended information (R. 49).
The State then filed an amended information adding the charge against Powell and
Ross of attempted murder, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 765-203 (R. 56), as indicated at the outset of the preliminary hearing (R. 228 at 4). The
attempted murder count was charged under theories of knowing, intentional, or depraved
indifference mens rea levels (R. 56).
The jurors convicted Powell of aggravated burglary and attempted murder and
acquitted him of aggravated robbery (R. 127, 172-76).
Judge Atherton sentenced Powell to a term of five years to life for the aggravated
burglary conviction and a consecutive term of one to fifteen years for the attempted
murder conviction (R. 188-189). Trial counsel filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 190,
201).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The basic factual theory of the State's case was that Powell entered a motel room
occupied by Roselynn Ellis, tried to sell her a bag of old clothes, pulled a gun and
made a clicking noise with it after threatening to kill Ellis if she moved, pistol whipped
Ellis with the gun, stole Ellis' purse before she pursued him to a Cadillac occupied by
Powell's co-defendant Tamara Ross, and then drove away from Ellis while pointing the
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gun at Ellis and pulling the trigger without firing (R. 235 at 65-70; 113-128).
To prove the facts essential to the State's theory, the State had two witnesses
Roselynn Ellis (R. 235 at 65-70) and Tamara Ross (R. 235 at 113-128).
The jury apparently disbelieved at least part of their testimony, because the jury
acquitted Powell of the aggravated robbery (R. 127, 172-76).
Ellis had been smoking crack cocaine and drinking alcohol for hours prior to the
alleged offenses (R. 235 at 143). She was nearsighted and required corrective lenses, but
was not wearing any, and her opportunity to view her assailant was limited by the stress
of the events and the fact that her assailant's face was partially covered by his hat (R. 235
at 135, 177, R. 236 at 201). She described her assailant in a manner that was inconsistent
with Powell's appearance (R. 235 at 140-41, 178), initially identified a relative of Tamara
Ross's as her assailant (R. 236 at 279), and repeatedly did not identify Powell during a
police show-up within hours of the offense, even when she was five feet away from him
(R. 235 at 150, 179). It was only when she was within arm's length of him, when Ellis
heard him speak and the police put a hat on him that she identified Powell as her assailant
(R. 235 at 150). The police did not require Ross's relative, whom Ellis first identified as
her assailant, to speak or put on a hat (R. 235 at 150, 152).
Tamara Ross, who was an old acquaintance of Ellis' from the crack cocaine world,
testified in exchange for the complete dismissal of charges identical to Powell's:
aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and attempted murder (R. 235 at 62-63, 90,
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153). As an accomplice who inculpated Powell to protect herself from serious criminal
liability, Ross was unreliable as a matter of law. See, e.g., Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530,
541 (1986) (accomplice confession inculpating others is presumptively unreliable); Lilly
v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 131 (1999) (same). At the time of her testimony, Ross
refrained from taking her prescription drugs, Seroquel and Eskalith,1 to avoid being
drowsy in court (R. 235 at 75). In the hours prior to the alleged offenses, in addition to
taking her mental health medications, she had been smoking crack cocaine (R. 235 at 76).
She has a very long list of names, partly because she had been married seven or eight
times, and goes by Denise, Cheyenne, Annette Coleman, Delores Davis, Tamara
Williams, Tamara Jackson, Tamara Gordon and Tamara Ross (R. 235 at 84-86). She was
convicted of giving false information to the police, when she once claimed to be her
niece, Sonya Salters, to avoid a warrant (R. 235 at 83). She also had a forgery conviction
(R. 235 at 84).
Ellis testified that before the alleged offenses, she saw Tamara Ross sitting in the
Cadillac outside Ellis' motel room, and was concerned by Ross's wearing a blonde wig
that she normally did not wear (R. 235 at 117). Ross gave inconsistent testimony
indicating that Ellis apparently owed Ross some money for clothing Ross had bought for
Ellis' daughter (R. 235 at 87-88), while Ellis maintained that Ross had given her some

1

These psychotropic medications are used to treat bi-polar disorder and
schizophrenia. See, e.g., www: Drugs.com.
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children's clothing, but that she could not recall owing Ross any money (R, 235 at 144).
The police stopped the Cadillac hours after Ellis called and reported the offenses,
and it was being driven by two young men who were relatives of Tamara Ross and
affiliates of the "Funk Mobb," an association of family members and other people in
Oakland, California (R. 235 at 77-78, 105).
Ellis initially thought one of these two young men was her assailant (R. 236 at
279).
The police recovered a gun bearing Ellis' blood from the street after Ross's
nephew, one of the two young men in the Cadillac, told them he had thrown it out the
Cadillac window when he first saw the police (R. 235 at 99, 190-91, R. 236 at 235-46).
The Cadillac contained a bag of clothes (R. 235 at 99). Ross's nephew claimed that
Powell had given him the clothes and the gun and told him to get rid of them (R. 235 at
95-96).
The police did not fingerprint the gun, and there was no evidence of the identity of
the registered owner (R. 235 at 192-93). The police did not find a magazine or clip for
the gun (R. 236 at 259). Ross testified that after Powell got into the Cadillac, he found
the clip underneath her where she had been sleeping and commented that that was why
the gun did not work (R. 235 at 70). The State's armory expert explained that the trigger
will not pull if the magazine is out because the gun safety feature disconnects the trigger
(R. 236 at 261). The gun was tested and fired properly when the police bought and
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inserted a clip (R. 236 at 264).
Powell testified that he was not the assailant, and that Ellis had misidentified him
(R. 236 at 293, 305). He conceded that he made some, but not all, of the inculpatory
statements attributed to him by the police, but maintained that these statements were
facetious, and made after Ellis had viewed him but not identified him, and while he had
maintained his innocence (R. 236 at 203, 214).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
To prove attempted murder, the State must prove the mens rea level of intent to
kill. The trial court's instructions permitting the jurors to convict for mens rea levels of
knowledge or depraved indifference were harmful error. While trial counsel did not
preserve the issue, this Court should address it, to avoid a manifest injustice.
The trial court erred in refusing Powell's lesser included offense instructions on
aggravated assault and assault. Ambiguities and inconsistencies in the State's evidence
regarding the assailant's intent provided a rational basis for acquitting of attempted
murder and convicting of aggravated assault or assault. To insure that Powell receives
the full benefit of the reasonable doubt standard of proof and that society's interests in the
integrity of the criminal justice system are served, this Court should order a new trial
wherein the lesser included offense instructions are given.
The cumulative effect of the foregoing errors with the prejudice stemming from
prosecutorial misconduct and other evidentiary errors justifies a new trial. To the extent
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that the issues were not fully preserved by trial counsel, this Court should address and
correct the errors under the plain error, exceptional circumstances or ineffective
assistance of counsel doctrines.
ARGUMENTS
I.
THE ATTEMPTED MURDER CONVICTION,
PREMISED ON INSTRUCTIONS ON
KNOWING OR DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE MENS REA LEVELS,
MUST BE REVERSED.
Consistent with the charge in the amended information (R. 56), the court instructed
the jurors on attempted murder, with mens rea levels of depraved indifference,
knowledge or intent (R. 165-67, Instructions 32 and 33).2 The court generally instructed
the jurors that "a unanimous concurrence of all jurors is required to find a verdict" (R.
170, Inst. 36), but did not instruct the jurors to reach a unanimous verdict on the mens rea
theory for the attempted murder count.
The jurors convicted Powell of attempted murder in a verdict which did not specify
a mens rea theory (R. 174).3
Attempted depraved indifference murder and knowing attempted murder are
2

These jury instructions are in the addendum.

3

The verdicts provided,
We, the jurors impaneled in the above case, find the defendant,
THOMAS CHARLES POWELL, Guilty of ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL
HOMICIDE, MURDER, as charged in Count III of the information.

(R. 174, 183).
8

nonexistent offenses under Utah law. See, State v. Casey. 2003 UT 55, 82 P.3d 1106;
State v. Perez. 2002 UT App 211, ffl 32-36, 52 P.3d 451; State v. Vigil. 842 P.2d 843
(Utah 1992), overruled. State v. Casey. 2003 UT 55, 82 P.3d 1106.4 This is so because
attempted murder requires proof of specific intent to kill, and the depraved indifference
and knowing mens reas do not rise to this level of specific intent. See Perez and Casey.
While trial counsel did not raise this issue in the trial court, this Court should
nonetheless correct the error on appeal under the exceptional circumstances, plain error
and/or ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines.
Courts utilize the extraordinary circumstances doctrine in cases involving "'rare
procedural anomalies,'" as a "'safety device'" to avoid manifest injustice. State v.
Nelson-Waggoner. 2004 UT 29, % 23, 94 P.3d 186.
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error
occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness
prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in
hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See, e.g.. State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d
29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert denied. 493 U.S. 814 (1989).
Given that Casey was published years prior to this trial, the trial court plainly erred
in failing to apply its very clear directive that an attempted murder conviction requires

4

In Casey, this Court overruled Vigil, holding that attempted murder requires proof
of an intentional mens rea, and that a knowing mens rea will not suffice. 2003 UT 55, ^f
8.
9

proof of specific intent to kill. See Casey, 2003 UT 55, 82 P.3d 1106, supra.
Application of the manifest error doctrine is appropriate in this context, for Mr.
Powell may be serving a separate consecutive sentence of one to fifteen years on the basis
of an offense that does not exist under Utah law. See State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276
(Utah 1993) (per curiam) (reversing conviction for attempted depraved indifference
murder to avoid manifest injustice and violation of Due Process Clauses of state and
federal constitutions, because Haston might be imprisoned for a non-existent offense).
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment and
Article I § 12, Powell must demonstrate that trial counsel's performance fell below
objectively reasonable standards of representation, and that this objectively deficient
performance was prejudicial. See e.g. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert.
denied 513 U.S. 966(1994).
One of the most basic duties of a trial lawyer is to properly raise and preserve all
issues in the lower court. See, e.g.. State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79 at *[f 10, 67 P.3d
1005. When a defense lawyer fails to assert beneficial, current law, this constitutes
objectively deficient performance, which will not be excused by the courts with
hypothetical tactical bases. See, State v. Moritzskv, 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989)
(trial counsel's failure to seek jury instruction reflecting current law beneficial to the
client was objectively deficient oversight of the law, which could not conceivably have
been valid trial strategy).
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The legal definition of crimes and jury instructions pertaining thereto are not snap
decisions that must be made in the heat of battle with the jury present, but can and should
be researched and studied well in advance of any trial, particularly a serious felony trial.
Failing to challenge the depraved indifference and knowing mens reas underlying
the attempted murder count was objectively deficient performance; there was and could
have been no valid strategic reason for trial counsel to have refrained from raising the
issue. Compare, e.g.. State v. Moritzky, 771 P.2d 688, 691-93 (Utah App. 1989) (trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance in obtaining a jury instruction on defense of
habitation which lacked helpful presumption provided in amended defense of habitation
statute, resulting the denial of a fair trial and the need for a new trial).
The giving of an attempted depraved indifference or knowing murder instruction
constitutes prejudicial error as long as the jurors may have concluded that the defendant
did not act with the specific intent to kill. See, e.g., Perez at ^ 29-32.
Utah law recognizes that proof of an intentional shooting, and/or shooting at close
range do not necessarily establish the requisite intent for an attempted murder conviction.
See Perez atfflj29-30, citing State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1993) (per
curiam); and State v. Tinoco, 860 P.2d 988 992 (Utah App. 1993).
In the instant matter, the jurors may well have concluded that Powell did not
harbor the specific intent to kill. The only two witnesses who testified regarding Powell's
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alleged intent were Roselynn Ellis and Tamara Ross.5
Ellis' version of events was that Powell knocked on her motel room door, entered
without her assistance because the doorknob was broken, showed her and tried to sell her
some old clothes without her asking him to leave, and then put a gun to her head, telling
her, "Move and I'll kill you, bitch." (R. 235 at 121). She testified that she responded by
turning, looking him in the eye, and instructing him, "Do it." (R. 235 at 121-22; R. 228 at
10). She heard a clicking sound, and the a bullet landed on her shoe (R. 235 at 22). She
testified that he then hit her very hard on the head with the butt of the gun perhaps nine to
eleven times until she kicked him and knocked him off the bed, fought with him for the
gun, and then cased him out of the room with the gun in his hand (R. 235 at 123-24). She
testified that she grabbed a phone, called 911, and ran to the car, where she held onto
Powell's car door trying to stop him from closing the door (R. 235 at 126). Ellis said she
heard Tamara Ross say, "Kill the bitch," and Powell said something to the effect of "Kill
her, I'm trying," or "Kill her, I can't even knock her out" or "I couldn't even knock her
out." (R. 235 at 127). Ellis said he pointed the gun at her face and pulled the trigger from
about a foot away, but again the gun did not fire (R. 235 at 127). Ellis then proceeded to

5

The State's armory expert testified that the bullet they found in Ellis' motel room
was a hollow point bullet, a particularly dangerous type which expands when fired, and
that if the gun the police recovered had shot this bullet right into a person's head, it likely
would have been fatal (R, 236 at 266). There was, however, no evidence that the
assailant was pointing the gun at or directly next to Ellis's head when he made the
clicking sound with the gun after she turned and told him to kill her, or that the assailant
knew that the gun contained such a bullet.
12

a different motel room to confront the man she thought "set her up," and then went with
the police to the show-ups involving Ross's two young men relatives and then Powell (R.
235 at 128-130). While Ellis' head was injured and bled, she declined medical treatment
(R. 235 at 133).
As detailed above in the statement of facts, supra, Ellis suffered from credibility
problems, and the jurors must have found her testimony incredible in some respects,
because they acquitted Powell of the aggravated robbery despite her testimony that her
purse was gone after he left the room (R. 235 at 125). They likewise may have found her
testimony regarding his use of a gun wholly or partly incredible. Given Powell's
supposed alternative statement that he was trying to knock her out (R. 235 at 127), and
particularly in the absence of evidence that the gun was still against or pointed at Ellis'
head when she turned and instructed Powell to kill her and heard the click of the gun, and
given that the gun was clearly not functioning when he pulled the trigger (R. 235 at 12122, 127; R. 228 at 10), the jurors may have believed that he was trying to frighten and
control her with the gun, and may not have believed that it was his intent to kill her.
As detailed in the statement of facts, supra, Tamara Ross suffered from credibility
problems, and the jurors must have disbelieved at least part of her testimony, because they
acquitted Powell of the aggravated robbery charge, despite Ross's testimony that Powell
took something from a purse and then threw the purse onto the freeway (R. 235 at 69).
They likewise may have distrusted her testimony that Powell awakened her when he ran
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to the car bloody and with a gun in hand, and that Ellis tried to block the door of the car
so Powell could not get in (R. 235 at 66-67).6 Ross testified that Powell said something
like I ' m going to kill you," and pulled the trigger of the gun, which did not fire (R. 235
at 68).7 The jurors may have found her testimony particularly incredible, given her claims
that she was referring to someone other than Ellis when she asked Powell, "Did you kill
the bitch?" (R. 235 at 69).
Given the jury instructions and general verdict, and the fundamentally questionable
nature of the State's witnesses and the inconsistencies in their statements, there is a
reasonable likelihood that the attempted murder conviction rests on jury findings of mens
reas less than specific intent to kill. Compare Casey. 2003 UT 55, 82 P.3d 1106 (jurors
instructed on knowing and intentional mens reas and convicted of attempted murder;
Court found that verdict necessarily reflected intentional mens rea, because defendant
threatened to kill the victim, put the gun to victim's neck, pointed the gun at the victim's
head and misfired, pointed the gun at the victim's feet and fired, and then fired the gun
again as the victim was retreating); State v. Haston. 846 P.2d 1276, 1277 and n.l (Utah
1993) (Court reversed conviction for attempted depraved indifference murder; Haston
6

Ellis did not testify that she tried to block Powell from getting in the car. She
testified that she held onto the window to prevent him from closing the door (R. 235 at
126).
7

Ellis did not testify that Powell threatened to kill her, but instead testified that in
response to Ross's command that he "kill the bitch," he responded, "Kill her, I'm trying,"
or "Kill her, I can't even knock her out" or "I couldn't even knock her out." (R. 235 at
127).
14

shot victim in the chest at close range during a drunken quarrel). See also State v. Perez,
2002 UT App 211 f 31, 52 P.3d 451 (noting Haston admitted that he intentionally shot his
victim).
Accordingly, this Court should reverse Powell's conviction for attempted murder.
See Casey and Haston, supra.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
POWELL'S LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS.
Trial counsel submitted instructions for lesser included offenses of aggravated
assault and assault (R. 105-108, R. 236 at 226-330). In closing argument, the prosecutor
argued that Powell intended to assault Ellis (R. 237 at 339).
However, the court refused to instruct on the lesser included offenses, stating,
I have reviewed the testimony here and there certainly is a possibility
that the jury would not believe any of the witnesses. However, the State's
case does not just hinge on the testimony of Ms. Ellis. Ms. Ross herself
testified that the defendant turned to the victim and said, I'm going to kill
you, clicked the gun two times, pointing it at this victim's head in the car as
well. So you have more than one witness. The standard here is a rational
basis for an acquittal and of the greater offense and the conviction of the
included or lesser offense.
Based on looking at all of the evidence that the jury will weigh, the
jury can always acquit, but a rational basis for an acquittal and of a
conviction of a lesser offense I just cannot find by the evidence and so I'm
going to not permit the lesser included offenses. Were they to believe the
witnesses, then it would clearly fall under an attempted murder. That is,
pointing the gun to the victim's head and pulling the trigger on four
different occasions, two times inside, two times outside the motel room, and
that is attempted murder.
(R. 236 at 329-330).
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The trial court's finding that Powell pointed the gun at Ellis' head and pulled the
trigger twice while she was in the motel room is clearly erroneous and there is no
evidence to marshall in support of it.
Ellis testified that he had the gun to her head, that she turned to him and told him
to do it, and that she heard a clicking sound (R. 235 at 122). The prosecutor asked, "After
you heard the noise that indicated that he was trying to fire the gun into your head, did
you hear him do anything else to the handgun?" and she answered, "I just heard clicking
and then the bullet was - landed on my - hit my shoe." (R. 235 at 122).
The trial court's rationale, that when some shoots at another person multiple times
at close range this is necessarily attempted murder (R. 236 at 329-330), conflicts with
those Utah cases which recognize the contrary proposition - that shooting someone, even
successfully, from close range, does not necessarily establish intent to kill. See, e.g.,
Haston and Tmoco, supra.
As a matter of law, the trial court should have given the lesser included offense
instructions.
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
requires the government to prove elements of criminal offenses beyond a reasonable
doubt. ELg,, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The standard applies in all federal
and state courts. E.g., Sullivan v. La., 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993). The reasonable doubt
standard gives "concrete substance" to the presumption of innocence, and thereby creates
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public confidence in the criminal justice system. Winship at 363-64. It also serves the
defendants' liberty interests and protects the defendants from the stigma of criminal
convictions. Id. at 363. "It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be
diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being
condemned." Id.
Lesser included offense instructions are designed to insure that all criminal
defendants get the full benefit of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof. State
v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah 1984). Due process requires lesser included offense
instructions when the evidence warrants them, because our courts recognize that jurors
may convict of charged offenses in the absence of legally adequate proof of the charged
offenses if the only alternative is setting free someone who is clearly guilty of some
violent crime. The lesser included offense doctrine thus provides the jurors with a
compromise option between conviction of the charged offense and outright acquittal.
See, e.g.. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 157 (Utah 1983).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) indicates that a defendant may be convicted of a
lesser included offense, which is defined as follows:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of
preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included
offense.
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The same statute provides in subsection (4) that no lesser included offense
instruction need be given unless "there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense."
Under the test of State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), the Court first
considers whether the elements of the charged and lesser offenses overlap and may be
proved by the same facts, and then requires lesser offense instructions if there is an
alternative interpretation of the evidence which provides a rational basis for acquitting of
the greater offense and convicting of the lesser. Id. at 160. In assessing whether a lesser
included offense instruction should have been given, this Court views the evidence in the
light most favorable to the defendant. State v. Crick. 675 P.2d 527, 532 (Utah 1983).
Courts review the "whole of the evidence" in assessing whether there is basis for a
lesser included instruction; a defendant need not admit his guilt of the lesser included
offense in order to justify the lesser offense instruction. See State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d
551, 555-56 (Utah 1984) (Court reversed conviction for aggravated assault for lack of a
lesser included offense instruction on threatening with a dangerous weapon, despite the
fact that the defendant denied pointing his gun at the officer).
There are some cases which may be read as precluding a lesser included offense
instruction in cases wherein the defendant denies having committed the crime. E.g., State
v. Shabata. 678 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah 1984) (trial court did not err in refusing lesser
included offense instruction on manslaughter in a case wherein the evidence did not
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support the manslaughter theory and defendant's evidence was that he did not commit the
murder).
In the instant matter, Powell's theory of the case - that Ellis misidentified him as
the assailant - was compatible with the lesser included offense instructions, which may
have more accurately captured the assailant's intent than the attempted murder
instructions.
Particularly because the lesser included offense doctrine is designed to give all
defendants the benefit of the reasonable doubt standard, e.g., Oldroyd, supra, and because
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is designed to instill community confidence in the
criminal justice system, see Winship, supra, society's interests call for the giving of a
reasonable doubt instruction whenever there is a rational basis anywhere in the whole of
the evidence to acquit the defendant of the offense charged, see Baker, supra.
Applying the Baker analysis here confirms that the trial court should have given
the lesser included offense instruction. Attempted murder, aggravated assault and assault
do have overlapping elements which may be proved by the same facts. An attempted
murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill and the taking of a substantial step
toward causing the death of another which strongly corroborates the intent to cause that
person's death. See, e.g.. State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, ^ 14 and 15. An assault
conviction may be premised on proof of attempts to, threats of, or causing a bodily injury.
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See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (defining assault).8 An aggravated assault conviction
may be premised on proof of assaults involving deadly weapons or the intentional
infliction of serious bodily injury. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (defining aggravated
assault).9 See also State v. Tunzt 2001 UT App 224, p , 31 P.3d 588 (noting in dicta that
court instructed on aggravated assault, lesser offense of attempted murder), overruled on
other grounds. State v. Tunzl 2002 UT 119, 63 P.3d 70.
In this instance, if given the opportunity with correct instructions, the jurors may

8

§ 76-5-102. Assault
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another
or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury to
another.
9

§ 76-5-103. Aggravated assault
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 76-5102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses a
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to
produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony.
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well have acquitted Powell of attempted murder and convicted of aggravated assault or
simple assault, either because the actions attested to by Ellis and/or Ross (his threatening
to kill if she moved, repeatedly pulling the trigger of a gun that did not fire, hitting Ellis
over the head with a gun, and perhaps making a statement that he tried to knock her out)
did not establish specific intent to kill, or because the jurors did not believe either Ellis or
Ross regarding exactly what occurred, and were left to rely on the only conclusive
physical evidence to sustain a assault conviction: Ellis' bleeding head.
Because our society has no interest in incarcerating Powell for a greater offense
than a properly instructed jury would convict him of, and has a vested interest in the
integrity and full benefit of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof, see Winship,
supra, this Court should reverse Powell's attempted murder conviction and instruct the
trial court to give the lesser included offense instructions on retrial. See Baker, supra,
III.
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND
EVIDENTIARY ERRORS REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL.
If the cumulative effect of multiple errors undermines this Court's confidence in
the fairness of a trial, this Court will order a new one. See, e.g.. State v. Kohl, 2000 UT
35, Tf 25, 999 P.2d 7. Mr. Powell asserts the cumulative error doctrine with regard to all
of the errors in his case, particularly with regard to the prosecutorial misconduct and other
evidentiary errors discussed infra.
Utah law has long recognized that a criminal trial is supposed to be a search for the
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truth, rather than a mere contest between the defense and prosecution.

In State v.

Saunders. 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 951, the Court explained the special role of the
prosecutor, which does not call for overreaching, but which requires constant vigilance
for fairness. The Court stated,
Once again we observe that prosecutors have duties that rise above those of
ff
privately employed attorneys
[P]rosecutors have a duty to eschew all
improper tactics." ...
"[A prosecuting attorney] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is
as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the
servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one."
Id. at 961 (citations omitted).
If a prosecutor's comments taint the fundamental fairness of the proceedings, the
arguments violate a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law. See.
e.g.. Darden v. Wainwright 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986).11 Claims of prosecutorial
10

See, e ^ , Statev.Hav. 859 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1993); State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656,
662 (Utah 1985); State v. JarrelL 608 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah 1980).
11

Article I §§ 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution provide due process of law and the
right to a fair trial, as does Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6. Article I § 7, the due process
provision, has been interpreted as requiring exclusion of unreliable evidence which is
likely to be unduly impressive to jurors, see State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991),
and as requiring an inquiry into the merits of the case to be adjudicated, see
generally Christiansen v. Harris. 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945). Article I § 12 provides
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misconduct require a fact-specific inquiry which is guided by the defendant's
constitutional rights to a fair trial.12
In Utah, the general test for prosecutorial misconduct is set forth in State v. Troy,
688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984), as follows:
"The test of whether the remarks made by counsel are so
objectionable as to merit a reversal in a criminal case is, did the remarks call
to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified in
considering in determining their verdict, and were they, under the
circumstances of the particular case, probably influenced by those remarks."
Id. at 486 (citation omitted). Arguing matters unsupported by evidence violates Troy. Id.
The Troy Court persuasively explained the prejudice analysis further,
Step two is more difficult and involves a consideration of the
circumstances of the case as a whole. In making such a consideration, it is
appropriate to look at the evidence of defendant's guilt.
"If proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct or
remark will not be presumed prejudicial." Likewise, in a case with less
compelling proof, this Court will more closely scrutinize the conduct. If the
conclusion of the jurors is based on their weighing conflicting evidence or
evidence susceptible of differing interpretations, there is a greater
likelihood that they will be improperly influenced through remarks of
counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the jurors may be searching for guidance in
weighing and interpreting the evidence. They may be especially susceptible
the general procedural and substantive rights of criminal defendants to insure the
fundamental fairness of criminal proceedings. See, generally. State v. Anderson, 612
P.2d 778 (Utah 1980). When a prosecutor's arguments draw the jurors' attention away
from the merits of the case, and call into question the reliability and fairness of the
proceedings and verdict or sentence, these provisions are implicated.
12

See United States v. Soconv-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 240 (194Q)("Of
course, appeals to passion and prejudice may so poison the minds of the jurors even in a
strong case that an accused may be deprived of a fair trial.... [Ejach case necessarily turns
on its own facts.").
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to influence, and a small degree of influence may be sufficient to affect the
verdict. Counsel is obligated in such cases to avoid, as far as possible, any
reference to those matters the jury is not justified in considering.
Id. at 486-87 (citation omitted).
It is the State's burden to show that prosecutorial misconduct was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. State v. Tarafa. 720P.2d 1368, 1373 andn.21 (Utah 1986). All
reasonable doubts are to be resolved in favor of the defendant. State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d
1114, 1116 (Utah 1977).13
Powell's prosecutor argued in closing that Powell attempted to shoot Ellis twice in
the motel room and that he racked the gun in between attempts in an effort to load a bullet
into the chamber, thereby proving his intent to kill Ellis. He stated,
He presses it to her head and says, Move, bitch, and you die. And
shortly thereafter, he tries to make it come true by pulling the trigger. The
gun does not fire. And Sergeant Huggard told you why the gun didn't fire.
The magazine wasn't in it. But there was a round in the chamber. He really
wants to kill this woman.
What does he do? He racks the slide back, and you saw Sergeant
Huggard demonstrate it, you watched the dummy round go flying, and the
slide goes forward and he's thinking that another round is being fed from
the magazine into the chamber, puts it to her head again and pulls the
trigger. That is intentional, that is depraved, and it shows very clearly his
intent of what he wanted to do at that moment; kill her.
Remember Sergeant Huggard told you about the little red buttons on
the gun that indicated when it was ready to fire, so he had to have been
aware that that gun was ready to go.

13

More recent opinions from this Court have stated differing standards. See, e.g..
State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1993)(a defendant must show that the results would
likely have been more favorable in the absence of the misconduct).
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(R. 237 at 342).
The prosecutor echoed this argument in his final rebuttal closing, wherein he
argued that Powell tried to "blow her brains out" on four separate occasions (R. 237 at
369).
The prosecutor drew the jurors' attention to facts not in evidence in these
arguments and violated the fairness of Powell's trial, because there is no evidence that
Powell tried to shoot Ellis four times or ever racked the gun to put a bullet in place to
shoot Ellis.
Ellis did not testify that Powell tried to shoot her twice in the motel room, or that
he racked the gun in the motel room. She testified that he had the gun to her head and
threatened to kill her if she moved, that she turned to him and told him to do it, and that
she heard a clicking sound (R. 235 at 122). The prosecutor asked, "After you heard the
noise that indicated that he was trying to fire the gun into your head, did you hear him do
anything else to the handgun?" and she answered, "I just heard clicking and then the
bullet was - landed on my - hit my shoe." (R. 235 at 122),
While it is true that the State's armory expert, Alex Huggard, demonstrated to the
jury that if the gun is racked, the bullet ejects (R. 264), he did not testify that racking the
gun loads bullets into the chamber to be fired. Instead, he testified that because the gun is
a semi-automatic, it automatically feeds the next bullet into place each time the trigger
pulls (R. 264). Thus, the prosecutor was incorrect in arguing to the jury that Powell's
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supposed racking of the gun demonstrated Powell's intent to kill, because there was no
evidence that Powell racked the gun, and in any event, racking the gun would eject, not
load, a bullet, thus running counter to any intent to kill.
While Huggard also testified that the gun has a visible button indicating when the
firing pin is cocked and a round is in the chamber ready to fire (R. 264), there is no
evidence that this button was visible when the assailant had the gun or that this
demonstrated his intent to kill. Rather, because the bullet apparently fell out of the gun
when the assailant tried to fire it (R. 235 at 122), it appears that the bullet was not in the
chamber ready to be fired, because in order to get the bullet out of the gun during the
demonstrations, the State's expert did not attempt to fire the gun without the clip, but
instead racked the slide back to eject the bullet from the chamber (R. 235 at 264).
Given the poor quality of the State's witnesses essential to the charges, whom the
jury did not entirely believe, see Statement of Facts, supra, the State cannot meet its
burden to prove this misconduct harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, see Tarafa, supra,
and assuming he must, Powell can show a reasonable likelihood of a different result
absent this misconduct, see Hay, supra. The attempted murder verdict may have rested
entirely on the prosecutor's misleading argument that Powell was trying to rack a bullet
into the firing chamber prior to pulling the trigger a second time in the motel room, for
this graphic image is far more suggestive of intent to kill than merely pulling the trigger
of a gun that does not fire, an action which might occur in an effort to frighten or control,
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rather than to kill.
Particularly when the prejudice from these closing arguments is considered in
conjunction with that caused by additional errors, this Court should conclude that a new
trial is warranted. See Kohl supra.
In cross-examining Mr. Powell, without objection by trial counsel, the prosecutor
asked him if he had been convicted of a felony, and Mr. Powell answered yes (R. 236 at
319). The prosecutor did not elaborate on this to establish any bearing on Powell's
credibility under Utah R. Evid. 609, or to establish a legitimate purpose for such
evidence, such as to establish modus operandi or intent under 404(b). Rather, the
question appears to have been designed solely to persuade the jurors to convict Powell on
the theory of criminal propensity, in violation of well established Utah law. See, e.g..
State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f 15, 992 P.2d 951 (citing extensive case law prohibiting
the admission of evidence of the defendant's other crimes unless the evidence is probative
of something other than criminal propensity and is not unduly prejudicial).
In order to introduce prior crimes evidence against a criminal defendant, the
proponent must first establish a non-character purpose for the evidence. See, e.g.. State v.
Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ^J 21, 993 P.2d 837. Because this was never done in this case, the
evidence was inadmissible. See id.
The prosecutor established in cross-examining Powell that Powell did not use an
alias when he was booked, but used his own name (R. 236 at 319). Over hearsay and lack
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of personal knowledge objections, the State's case manager was allowed to testify in
rebuttal that Powell used and was booked under the name James Johnson (R. 236 at 322).
Trial counsel established that the case manager had no personal knowledge of this (R. 236
at 323).
At the end of his rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor dramatically
emphasized this testimony in arguing that Powell had lied to the jury. He stated,
Now, do you remember yesterday when the defendant testified, he
swore to tell you the truth. And you have several jury instructions that talk
about if people tell lies you can disregard their entire testimony. Well, the
defendant, Thomas Charles Powell, told you a lie yesterday. But the last
thing he said, he told you, and you probably wondered why I was getting
obsessive about it, And what name did you tell the police? Thomas. When
the police brought you out what name did you give them? Thomas. And
then when you were taken away and then you - did you give them your last
name? Thomas Powell. Detective Burningham the case manager, the case
manager who puts all the reports together, the name that was given to the
police that morning was James Johnson. He can't even tell you the truth.
(R. 237 at 369).
The trial court was correct in overruling trial counsel's hearsay objection, because
Powell's supposed assertion that his name was James Johnson was not admitted to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. See Utah R. Evid. 801(c) (defining hearsay as "a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.").
As trial counsel correctly objected (R. 236 at 322), the trial court should not have
permitted the case manager to attest to this, because the case manager had no personal
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knowledge that Powell gave the police the name of James Johnson. See Utah R. Evid.
602. When witnesses are allowed to testify without personal knowledge, this defeats the
purpose of Rule 602, to insure that the witness knows what he is talking about. See Fox
v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 453 P.2d 701, 702 (Utah 1969). More importantly, in this criminal
case, permitting the case manager to testify to Powell's supposed provision of an alias to
the police effectively foreclosed Powell's exercise of his right to confront the witness
against him, because whoever wrote the report identifying Powell as James Johnson was
never brought before the jurors, placed under oath, and subjected to cross-examination
prior to the jury's assessment of this person's credibility. But see, e.g.. State v. Vargas,
2001 UT 5, Tf 28 n.7, 20 P.3d 271 (in discussing the Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth
Amendment and Article I § 12, the Court explained that the confrontation requirement
impresses the witness of the duty to tell the truth, subjects the witness to crossexamination, and gives the jury the opportunity to assess the witness's credibility).
The fact that the prosecutor opted to assert this evidence at the end of his final
rebuttal argument demonstrates the value of the evidence to his case, and the prejudicial
effect of the evidence. The State has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
e.g., Winship, supra, and was left with the unenviable job of meeting that burden with the
testimony of two conflicting crack cocaine users, Roselynn Ellis and Tamara Ross. See
Statement of Facts, supra. Despite the fact that their testimony concerning the alleged
aggravated robbery did not conflict (R. 235 at 69, 125), the jurors disbelieved them and
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acquitted Powell of that count (R. 127). Had the prosecutor not been permitted to
introduce the evidence that Powell was a convicted felon who supposedly lied to the
police about his name and then to the jurors, there is a reasonable likelihood of a different
result on the remaining counts as well. See Statement of Facts, supra.
To the degree that trial counsel did not preserve the issues discussed above, this
Court should nonetheless address and correct the error under the exceptional
circumstances, plain error and/or ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines.
Courts utilize the extraordinary circumstances doctrine in cases involving "'rare
procedural anomalies/" as a "'safety device5" to avoid manifest injustice. State v.
Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, Tf 23, 94 P.3d 186.
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error
occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness
prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in
hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See, e.g.. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d
29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989).
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment and
Article I § 12, Powell must demonstrate that trial counsel's performance fell below
objectively reasonable standards of representation, and that this objectively deficient
performance was prejudicial. See e^g. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert.
denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994).
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One of the most basic duties of a trial lawyer is to properly raise and preserve all
issues in the lower court. See, e.g.. State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79 at ^f 10, 67 P.3d
1005. When a defense lawyer fails to assert beneficial, current law, this constitutes
objectively deficient performance, which will not be excused by this Court with
hypothetical tactical bases. See, State v. Moritzskv, 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989)
(trial counsel's failure to seek jury instruction reflecting current law beneficial to the
client was objectively deficient oversight of the law, which could not conceivably have
been valid trial strategy).

;

The law forbidding prosecutors to misstate the evidence has been the law for years
in this State, see, e^g., Troy, as has the law forbidding prosecutors to present prior crimes
evidence solely to establish a criminal defendant's criminal propensities, see,
e.g., Saunders. The trial court and trial counsel both should have intervened when the
prosecutor misstated the evidence so graphically, and introduced Powell's status as a
felon to establish his criminal character. See id. The prejudice from these incidents
combines with the prejudice from the prosecutor's introduction and heavy reliance on the
case manager's speculative testimony that Powell provided a false name to the police, and
the procedural prejudice of the erroneous jury instructions and lack of lesser offense
instructions, to require a new trial, because the cumulative effect of the errors undermines
reasonable confidence in the fairness and reliability of the proceedings. See Kohl, supra.
CONCLUSION
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This Court should reverse Powell's convictions and remand this matter for retrial.
Respectfully submitted this January £5, 2006..

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, first class
postage pre-paid to: Fred Voros, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 this January 25,
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ADDENDUM

TRANSCRIPTS OF TRIAL COURT RULINGS

MR. SIMMS:

I would ask -- the objection is personal

knowledge on this particular case.

If he has personal

knowledge of a name given.
MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:

No, I asked

—

No, that's not it.

Overruled.

You may

go forward.
Q

(BY MR. UPDEGROVE)

In the report that you make, as

the arrested person do you use the name that is given to you?
A

As far as how they're booked into jail?

Q

Yes.

A

Is that what you're asking?

A majority of the time,

yes, sir.
Q

All right.

In this specific case, what was the name

that was given to the officers, that you got in booking for the
individual that's sitting right there when you
MR. SIMMS:

Objection, hearsay.

THE COURT:

Overruled.

Q

(BY MR. UPDEGROVE)

A

I —

—

What is the name that was used?

I understood and I was told that the name used

and booked under was James Johnson.
MR. UPDEGROVE:
THE COURT:
Q

And may I approach, Your Honor?

Yes.

(BY MR. UPDEGROVE)

I hand you —

do you recognize

that particular sheet of paper that I've handed you?
A

Yes, sir.
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MR. SIMMS:

I think that is the issue is rational

basis for acquitting and the lesser included.
THE COURT:

It's an and.

MR. SIMMS:

It is an and, and that is the issue.

what we're presenting is the same.

And

If they discount, saying

that the victim was on crack Cocaine or medicine or drinking
that night and we really can't believe what she said so those
events didn't occur, there's a rational basis for that in terms
of the gun and the trigger being pulled, so they discount that,
they don't believe that, they do believe that she was hit over
the head, so there is a rational basis for acquitting of the
attempted murder and yet convicting on the assault, you know,
the primary theory in our case is the defendant wasn't there,
he didn't do that.

That would —

straight acquittal.

And it

wouldn't entitle us to a lesser included because our position
is he wasn't there at all.
So our argument now to the Court isn't that he wasn't
there, our argument is that they could discount the fact the
gun was put to her head and that the trigger was pulled, they
can disregard any of that witness's testimony and they can
choose not to believe that.

And if they do choose to not

believe that then they can believe that that person in fact hit
her over the head with the gun then we have a different level
of assault.
THE COURT:

I have reviewed the testimony here and
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there certainly is a possibility that the jury would not
believe any of the witnesses.

However, the State's case does

not just hinge on the testimony of Ms. Ellis.

Ms. Ross herself

testified that the defendant turned to the victim and said, I'm
going to kill you, clicked the gun two times, that Ms. Ross
could see him clicking it two times, pointing it at this
victim's head in the car as well.
witness.

So you have more than one

The standard here is a rational basis for an

acquittal and of the greater offense and the conviction of the
included or lesser offense.
Based on looking at all of the evidence that the jury
will weigh, the jury can always acquit, but a rational basis
for an acquittal and of a conviction of a lesser offense I just
cannot find by the evidence and so I'm going to not permit the
lesser included offenses.

Were they to believe the witnesses,

then it would clearly fall under an attempted murder.

That is,

pointing the gun to the victim's head and pulling the trigger
on four different occasions, two times inside, two times
outside the motel room, and that is attempted murder.
All right.

I will, then, take your Long instruction,

Mr. Simms, I'll put together the jury instructions that we have
agreed to and I will certainly separate the one indicating that
Mr. Powell has testified, use that —
MR. SIMMS:

Yes.

THE COURT:

—

witness stock instruction.

And let's
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICTS ON ATTEMPTED MURDER

INSTRUCTION NO.
Before

you

can

convict

the

5^
defendant,

THOMAS

CHARLES

POWELL, of the offense of Attempted Criminal Homicide, Murder as
charged in Count III of the Information, you must find from all
of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one
of the following elements of that offense:
1.

That

on or about the

12th day of January, 2003,

in

Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, THOMAS CHARLES
POWELL, attempted to cause the death of Roselynn Ellis; and
2.

That

intentionally

said
or

defendant

knowingly;

or

then

and

there

(b) acting

did

under

so:

(a)

circumstances

evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, he knowingly
engaged

in

conduct

which

created

a

grave

risk

of

death

to

Roselynn Ellis and and thereby attempted to cause the death of
Roselynn Ellis; and
3.

That said defendant then and there did so unlawfully.

If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must find the defendant guilty of Attempted Criminal Homicide,
Murder as charged in Count III of the Information.

If, on the

other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of
any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find
the defendant not guilty of Count III.

INSTRUCTION NO.

33

As used in these instructions, "grave risk of death" refers
to

probability

of

the

risk

of

death

"substantial and unjustifiable" risk.

greater

A

than

just

a

"grave risk of death"

means a highly likely probability that death will result

from

the risk that the defendant knowingly creates.
The term "knowingly" as used in the definition of depraved
indifference murder means that the actor knew the nature of his
conduct, knew the circumstances that gave rise to the risk of
death, and knew that the risk constituted a grave risk of death,
but he need not have had as his conscious objective or desire to
cause

the

result; nor, need

he be aware

that

his conduct

is

reasonably certain to cause the results i.e., death.
The term

"depraved indifference to human life" refers not

to the subjective culpable mental state of depraved indifference
murder, but rather to an objective reasonable person standard as
to the value of human life.

"Depraved indifference" means an

utter callousness toward the value of human life and a complete
and total indifference as to whether one's conduct will create a
grave risk of death to another.
indifference
magnitude

must

of

the

be based on an objective

evaluation

risk

the

created

surrounding

the

death.

That

gravity

the

risk

human

of

callousness

of

Thus, a finding of

to

attitude

toward

and

of

all

evaluation
life
that

should

that
risk.

is

evidence, the jury should consider the following

of

the

circumstances
focus

on

the

and

the

evaluating

the

factors:

(1)

created

In

depraved

the utility of the defendant's conduct which caused the death;

INSTRUCTION NO.
Page 2
(2)

the

33

magnitude

of

the

risk

created

by

the

defendant's

conduct; (3) the defendant's knowledge of the risk; and (4) any
precaution taken by the defendant to minimize that risk.

INSTRUCTION NO.

y*

A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if,
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the
commission

of

the

offense,

that

person

engages

in

conduct

constituting a substantial step towards the commission of the
offense.
Conduct does not constitute a substantial step unless it is
strongly
offense.

corroborative

of

the

actor's

intent

to

commit

the

No defense to the offense of attempt arises because

the offense attempted was actually committed or due to factual
or legal impossibility if the offense could have been committed
had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them
to be.

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT,SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
VERDICT
Plaintiff,
Count III

-vsTHOMAS CHARLES POWELL,

Case No. 031904386FS

Defendant.
We,

the

Jurors

impaneled

in

the

above

case,

find

the

defendant, THOMAS CHARLES POWELL ,/^gui 1 ty of ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL
HOMICIDE, MURDER, as charged in Count III of the Information.
DATED this

"^

_

day of

/A p*~\ \

/ 20 o ^

ersa

o

In The Third Judicial District Court Of Salt Lake County
State of Utah

VERDICT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS CHARLES POWELL,
Defendant,

Case No. 031904386

We, thejuj^sdrnpaneied in the above case,findthV^EfeTidBatr-J^IOMASCHARLES
POWELK^Qujl^ofATTEMPTED CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER/ascharged in Count
III of the Information.
DATED THIS I

^

DAY OF APRIL, 2005.

REQUESTED LESSER OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

INSTRUCTION NO.

You are instructed that you cannot find the defendant, Thomas Powell, guilty of
the lesser included offense of Assault unless all of the following elements are true beyond
a reasonable doubt:
1.

That on or about January 12, 2003 in Salt Lake County, Utah;

2.

The Defendant, Thomas Powell;

3.

Committed an act with unlawful force or violence;

4.

That caused bodily injury to another or created a substantial risk
of bodily injury to another.

If the prosecution has failed to prove any one of these elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant, Thomas Powell, not guilty.
However, if the prosecution has proved each one of the foregoing elements of the lesser
included offense of Assault beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant
guilty.

U.C. A. §76-5-102

INSTRUCTION NO.

You are instructed that you cannot find the defendant, Thomas Powell, guilty of
the lesser included offense of Assault unless all of the following elements are true beyond
a reasonable doubt:
1.

That on or about January 12, 2003 in Salt Lake County, Utah;

2.

The Defendant, Thomas Powell;

3.

Committed an act with unlawful force or violence;

4.

That caused bodily injury to another or created a substantial risk
of bodily injury to another.

If the prosecution has failed to prove any one of these elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant, Thomas Powell, not guilty.
However, if the prosecution has proved each one of the foregoing elements of the lesser
included offense of Assault beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant
guilty.

INSTRUCTION NO.

You are instructed that you cannot find the defendant, Thomas Powell, guilty of
the lesser included offense of Assault, a Class A Misdemeanor, unless all of the following
elements are true beyond a reasonable doubt:
1.

That on or about January 12,2003 in Salt Lake County, Utah;

2.

The Defendant, Thomas Powell;

3.

Committed an act with unlawful force or violence;

4.

That caused substantial bodily injury to another or created a substantial risk
of bodily injury to another.

If the prosecution has failed to prove any one of these elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant, Thomas Powell, not guilty.
However, if the prosecution has proved each one of the foregoing elements of the lesser
included offense of Assault beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant
guilty.

INSTRUCTION NO.

You are instructed that you cannot find the defendant, Thomas Powell, guilty of
the lesser included offense of Assault, a Class A Misdemeanor, unless all of the following
elements are true beyond a reasonable doubt:
1.

That on or about January 12, 2003 in Salt Lake County, Utah;

2,

The Defendant, Thomas Powell;

3,

Committed an act with unlawful force or violence;

4.

That caused substantial bodily injury to another or created a substantial risk
of bodily injury to another.

If the prosecution has failed to prove any one of these elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant, Thomas Powell, not guilty.
However, if the prosecution has proved each one of the foregoing elements of the lesser
included offense of Assault beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant
guilty.

U.C. A. §76-5-102

INSTRUCTION NO.

You are instructed that you cannot find the defendant, Thomas Powell, guilty of
Aggravated Assault, as a lesser included offense unless each and every one of the
following elements are true and correct beyond a reasonable doubt:
1.

That on or about January 12, 2003 in Salt Lake County, Utah;

2.

The Defendant, Thomas Powell;

3.

Intentionally and knowingly committed an act with unlawful force or
violence;

4.

That Thomas Powell than and there intentionally caused serious bodily
injury to Roselynn Ellis.

If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced
of the truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt,
then you must find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Assault, as charged in the
information. However, if the prosecution has not proved each and every one of the
foregoing elements of Aggravated Assault beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find
Thomas Powell not guilty.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

Constitution of Utah, Article I § 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by
statute or rule.
United States Constitution, Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
United States Constitution, Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have

been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV § 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episodeIncluded offenses
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant under
a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different
ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one
such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a
prosecution under any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode,
unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to
separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is
arraigned on the first information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may
not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so
included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the
commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the
offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or

(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense
unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense
charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on
appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a
conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a
conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact
required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction
may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for the included
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101, Attempt—Elements of offense
(1) For purposes of this part, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if he:
(a) engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the crime;
and
(b)(1) intends to commit the crime; or
(ii) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, he acts with an awareness
that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause that result.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct constitutes a substantial step if it strongly
corroborates the actorfs mental state as defined in Subsection (l)(b).
(3) A defense to the offense of attempt does not arise:
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been committed if the
attendant circumstances had been as the actor believed them to be.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102. Assault
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another

or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury to another.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103. Aggravated assault
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in
1. Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses a
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to
produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203. Murder (2002)
(1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means:
(a) violation of Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5, Clandestine Drug Lab Act;
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is younger than 18
years of age;
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301;
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1;
(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302;
(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1;
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3:
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1;
(I) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404;
(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse of a child under Section 76-5-

404.1;
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402:
(1) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2;
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403;
(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405:
(0) arson under Section 76-6-102;
(p) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103;
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202;
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203;
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301;
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302; or
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-309.
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if:
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits an act clearly
dangerous to human life that causes the death of another;
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, the
actor engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby
causes the death of another;
(d)(1) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight
from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense, or is a party to
the predicate offense;
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed in the course of the
commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the commission or
attempted commission of any predicate offense;
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer while in the commission or
attempted commission of:
(1) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4; or
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under Section 76-8-305
if the actor uses force against a peace officer;
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the offense is reduced
pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(3); or
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is established under
Section 76-5-205.5.
(3) Murder is a first degree felony.

(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder that the
defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death of another:
(I) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse; or
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or
excuse for his conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable under
the existing circumstances.
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a)(I) emotional distress does not include:
(I) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2- 305; or
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct.
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection (4)(a)(I) or the
reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (4)(a)(ii) shall be determined from the
viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances.
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows:
(I) murder to manslaughter; and
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201. Definitions
For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any watercraft, aircraft, trailer,
sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of
persons or for carrying on business therein and includes:
(a) Each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or vehicle; and
(b) Each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or vehicle.
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at
night, whether or not a person is actually present.
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when the premises or
any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining are not open to the public and
when the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to enter or remain on the premises
or such portion thereof.
(4) "Enter" means:
(a) Intrusion of any part of the body; or
(b) Intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor.
§ 76-6-202. Burglary

(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any
portion of a building with intent to commit:
(a) a felony;
(b)theft;
(c) an assault on any person;
(d) lewdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(1);
(e) sexual battery, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702(3);
(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5: or
(g) voyeurism against a child under Subsection 76-9-702.7(2) or (5).
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a dwelling, in
which event it is a felony of the second degree.
(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses listed in
Subsections (l)(a) through (g), and which may be committed by the actor while he is in
the building.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203. Aggravated burglary
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, committing, or fleeing from
a burglary the actor or another participant in the crime:
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime;
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against any person who is
not a participant in the crime; or
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon.
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony.
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition as under Section
76-1-601.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301. Robbery
(1) A person commits robbery if:
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in
the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by
means of force or fear, and with a purpose or intent to deprive the person permanently or
temporarily of the personal property; or
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force against
another in the course of committing a theft or wrongful appropriation.

(2) An act is considered to be "in the course of committing a theft or wrongful
appropriation" if it occurs:
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft or wrongful appropriation;
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appropriation; or
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission.
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. Aggravated robbery
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1- 601:
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of
committing a robbery1 if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or
in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6. Rights of defendant
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel;
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him;
(c) To testify in his own behalf;
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf;
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where the offense is
alleged to have been committed;
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial within 30
days after arraignment if unable to post bail and if the
business of the court permits.

(2) In addition:
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense;
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to
secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those
rights when received;
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself;
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a husband against his wife;
and
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no contest,
or upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction,
upon a judgment by a magistrate.

Utah Rule of Evidence 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO
PROVE CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused,
or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of the alleged
victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence
of the same trait of character of the accused offered by the prosecution;
(2) Character of Alleged Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to Rebut the same, or
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first
aggressor;
(3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules
607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts, Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or

accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to
introduce at trial.
Utah Rules of Evidence 602. LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a
finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal
knowledge may, but need not, consist of the witness1 own testimony. This rule is subject
to the provisions of Rule 703, relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses.
Utah Rule of Evidence 609
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
1.(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a crime shall
be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence
that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
(b) Time Limit Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of
more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the
witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date,
unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the
conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its
prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as
calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party
sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence.
(c) Effect of Pardon, Annulment, or Certificate of Rehabilitation. Evidence of a
conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject of a
pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a
finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person has not been
convicted of a subsequent crime which was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or
other equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence.
(d) Juvenile Adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not

admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of
a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction of the offense
would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that
admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.
(e) Pendency of Appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render evidence
of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible.
Utah Rule of Evidence 801. DEFINITIONS
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct
of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement,
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject
to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with
the declarant's testimony or the witness denies having made the statement or has
forgotten, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an
express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the
person; or
(2) Admission by Party-Opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the
party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a
statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject,
or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of
the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a
statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy.

